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Twenty academic psychologists and neuroscientists, with an interest in autism and based within the
United Kingdom, were interviewed between 2012 and 2013 on a variety of topics related to the condi-
tion. Within these qualitative interviews researchers often argued that there had been a ‘turn to infancy’
since the beginning of the 21st century with focus moving away from the high functioning adolescent
and towards the pre-diagnostic infant deemed to be ‘at risk’ of autism. The archetypal research of this
type is the ‘infant sibs’ study whereby infants with an elder sibling already diagnosed with autism are
subjected to a range of tests, the results of which are examined only once it becomes apparent whether
that infant has autism. It is claimed in this paper that the turn to infancy has been facilitated by two
phenomena; the autism epidemic of the 1990s and the emergence of various methodological techniques,
largely although not exclusively based within neuroscience, which seek to examine social disorder in the
absence of comprehension or engagement on the part of the participant: these are experiments done to
participants rather than with them. Interviewees claimed that these novel methods allowed researchers
to see a ‘real’ autism that lay ‘behind’ methodology. That claim is disputed here and instead it is argued
that these emerging methodologies other various phenomena, reorienting the social abnormality
believed typical of autism away from language and meaning and towards the body. The paper concludes
by suggesting that an attempt to draw comparisons between the symptoms of autism in infant pop-
ulations and adults with the condition inevitably leads to a somaticisation of autism.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Autism's diagnostic history began in 1943 (Kanner, 1943) and
while there have certainly been signiﬁcant changes in the
perceived symptomology of autism since that time, autism has
come to be characterised as featuring a triad of core features in
“impaired social interaction, impaired verbal and non-verbal
communication and the presence of repetitive and restricted pat-
terns of behaviour” (White, 2013: 114). While autism is widely
understood as a ‘neurodevelopmental’ condition (Norbury and
Sparks, 2013), there is neither cause nor cure known for it.
As others have noted, autism is “… the condition of fascination
of the moment, occupying a number of cultural locations thatthe ESRC Open Competition
ildred Blaxter Post-Doctoral
ealth and Illness. We would
eir insightful comments. The
out has been invaluable.
.uk (G.J.S. Hollin), Alison.
r Ltd. This is an open access articlereﬂect a spectrum of wonder and nervousness” (Murray, 2008: 5).
Undoubtedly, the social science department has been one cultural
location to express a particular wonder with autism. To this end, a
number of recent pieces have considered autism in relation to affect
(Fitzgerald, 2013; Silverman, 2012), gender (Cheslack-Postava and
Jordan-Young, 2012), and socio-historical change (Evans, 2013;
Eyal et al., 2010; Nadesan, 2005). With reference to this ﬁnal
topic in particular, Danziger's claim that methodology is not onto-
logically neutral (Danziger, 1988) has been repeatedly borne out.
Kanner borrowed the term ‘autism’ from Bleuler, who referred to
a mode of thinking evident “… in dreams, pretend play and reveries,
and in the fantasies and delusions of the schizophrenic” (Feinstein,
2010: 6). This notion of ‘autistic fantasy’ was of central importance
for psychoanalysis. Autistic fantasy, however, was a phenomena hard
to capture within a psychology that had become increasingly
dependent upon statistics and randomisation by the middle of
twentieth century (Danziger, 2000: 344). Thus, as autism research
moved towards experimental psychology in the 1960s the notion of
‘autistic fantasy’, so amenable to the psychoanalytic case study and
yet so elusive within the laboratory, was largely abandoned (Evans,
2013: 4). It appears to be the case, therefore, that changes inunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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changes in the constructions of autism, with the previously central
phenomena of fantasy and hallucination becoming divorced from
the disease construct and replaced with cognitive and behavioural
symptoms more amenable to experimental cognitive psychology. It
has also been claimed that these changing methods allowed the
space for an examination of the modularisation of cognition,
meaning that it became possible to think of speciﬁc cognitive deﬁcits
as causing autism outside of an interpersonal, contextualised envi-
ronment (Hollin, 2014; Nadesan, 2005: 120).
This article contributes to this growing body of social scientiﬁc
knowledge concerning autism by considering two recent, related,
changes of focus within the psychological investigation of the
condition. Firstly, a turn to neuroscience; and, secondly, a turn to
infancy which has seen research increasingly focus upon children
that have not been, and may never be, diagnosed as autistic.
Through an analysis of interviews conducted with neuroscientists
and psychologists it is argued here that this turn to infancy has
been facilitated by particular neuroscientiﬁc techniques which are
performed on, rather than with, these children. Moreover, this
consideration of the infant is, once more, reconstructing autism
with focus shifting away from explicit communicative acts (e.g.
language) and towards non-conscious bodily expression.
2. Methods
The analyses within this paper rely upon data obtained through
qualitative interview and a critical reading of the published litera-
ture. The decision to utilise interviews was believed to be justiﬁed
in this case because the ﬁeld of autism research is of note, at least in
part, because of the plethora of viewpoints and competing claims
surrounding the condition; it was believed to be important that
such competing claims were investigated. Thus, the use of a
method that facilitated the sampling of a wide range of sites, and
potential viewpoints, was deemed to be the most appropriate.
The questions driving the project from which this paper arises
concerned the construction of autism within cognitive psychology
and social neuroscience, and an interview schedule of around 20
questions were drawn up with those themes in mind. It was
decided that pre-determined questions, formalised in interview
schedules, would be kept to a small number and that questions and
topics that arose during the course of the interviews would, to a
signiﬁcant degree, guide the discussion. The resultant interviews
are therefore best described as semi-structured.
The attempt made to keep interview questions/prompts as gen-
eral as possible was a deliberate strategy for this project, in order to
avoid “a piece of interview research [that] is chasing its own tail,
offering up its own agendas and categories and getting those same
agendas and categories back in a reﬁned or ﬁltered or inverted form”
(Potter and Hepburn, 2005: 293). Broadly, these interview questions
covered ﬁve areas; (i) how the participant came to be interested in
their research topic, (ii) the nature of autism, (iii) the nature of the
participant's current research, (iv) the impact of social neuroscience,
and (v) the role of advocacy groups in research. A great deal of
ﬂexibility was included however and topics of discussion were
allowed to digress to a quite signiﬁcant degree, within the time
constraints that existed. Interviews that were conducted lasted be-
tween 38 and 73 min, with a mean length of 55 min. Approximately
one-half of the interviews reached a natural close while the other
half were ended at a scheduled time, usually an hour.
2.1. Sampling
The intent of this project was to interview researchers with
interests in psychology, neuroscience, and autism and who werebased in the United Kingdom. In addition to existing knowledge of
the ﬁeld, potential participants suitable for interviewing were
sought through a variety of means; an internet search, discussion
with psychologists at the authors' own academic institution, and
ﬁnally by asking interviewees for further contacts. Potential in-
terviewees were contacted by e-mail with a brief explanation of the
project. It was made clear to participants that both individual and
institutional identities disclosed within interviews would be
removed in the act of transcription, that data would be securely
stored, and that the project had passed the School of Sociology and
Social Policy at The University of Nottingham's internal ethics
procedures. Though ﬁrst author's ﬁrst and Masters degree were
obtained in psychology, the project presented here was designed as
sociological in nature, and so the researcher presented himself to
interviewees as a sociologist interested in autism. Nonetheless, the
interviewer's background was never withheld from participants
and the ﬁrst author's background and current supervisory rela-
tionship with an autism neuroscientist was discussed on occasion.
Participants were given the opportunity to ask any outstanding
questions and, once satisﬁed, signed a consent form. If participants
had any further questions they were answered informally, again by
e-mail.
Twenty research interviews were undertaken for this project,
taking place between August 2012 and February 2013, all of which
were conducted in person by the ﬁrst author. This sample consisted
of 13 women and 7 men or, alternatively, 7 Professors, 2 Readers, 1
Senior Lecturer, 1 Associate Professor, 2 Lecturers, and 7 Post-
doctoral Researchers of various kinds. Eighteen researchers were
interviewed at their place of work, 1 was interviewed at a restau-
rant, and 1 was interviewed at their home. Twelve researchers
declined to take part in the project for a variety of reasons and an
additional 12 researchers were contacted but did not respond.
2.2. Analyses
All interviews were recorded verbatim and transcribed in full.
The extracts presented here have been anonymised and conclude
with a note of both the interviewee's academic position and the
interview number (e.g. Professor, interview 9). Some extracts also
include dialogue from the interviewer and those sections are pre-
ceded by an “I:”. The interviewee's response during these interac-
tional extracts is preceded by a two letter acronym based upon their
academic position (e.g. PD for Postdoctoral Researcher). Transcripts
were interrogated by hand in order to explore reoccurring themes.
While the broad themes identiﬁed in the sections above were of a
priori interest, the speciﬁc topics presented here arose within in-
terviews and where not of pre-existing concern. Once speciﬁc
themes had been established within interview there was a critical
reading of published literature in order to provide a socio-historical
context to this primary data. As the following section is intended to
demonstrate, it is through this contrast with historical readings
that the changing narratives within autism research become most
readily apparent.
2.3. A turn to infancy
2.3.1. A changing picture
It is the central argument of this paper that, within autism
studies, there has been a recent orientation towards infancy and the
body and that this shift has produced a signiﬁcantly altered disease
construction of autism. In order to expand upon this point, it is
worth considering experiments from both the 1980s and today
which are ostensibly concerned with the same phenomenon; an
examination of the social disorder believed to be at the core of
autism. The ﬁrst passage for consideration comes from themethods
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experiment conducted into autism. This study utilises an experi-
mental set-up known as the ‘Sally-Anne Test’ (SAT) (Wimmer and
Perner, 1983). The SAT test is conducted upon a table-top and on
that table top are two dolls (Sally and Anne), a covered basket, a
covered box, and a marble. The experimenter proceeds as follows:
“First, we checked that the children knewwhich doll was which
(Naming Question). Sally ﬁrst placed a marble in her basket.
Then she left the scene, and the marble was transferred by Anne
and hidden in her box. Then, when Sally returned, the experi-
menter asked the critical Belief Question: “Where will Sally look
for her marble?”. If the children point to the previous location of
the marble, then they pass the Belief Question by appreciating
the doll's now false belief. These conclusions are warranted if
two control questions are answered correctly: “Where is the
marble really?” (Reality Questions); “Where was the marble in
the beginning?” (Memory Question).”
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985: 41)
The SAT has several interesting features which are worthy of
greater consideration. Firstly, and like other experimental sce-
narios typical of the 1980s, completion of the SAT requires a
signiﬁcant amount of understanding on the part of the partici-
pant. The capacity to follow verbal instruction, for example, is an
obvious prerequisite in Baron-Cohen et al.'s experiment. Perhaps
more signiﬁcant, however, is that for Baron-Cohen et al. what is
important in the elucidation of perceived social impairment in
autism is an examination of a mental state entitled belief; an
explicit understanding of other agents and their intentions that
can be articulated via verbal report and which requires some
form of internal monologue based upon rumination, contem-
plation, conscious understanding and so forth. This theoretico-
methodological position has profound consequences for the
study of autism. Children might be expected to pass the SAT from
around the (chronological) age of four but during the 1980s ex-
periments were usually only feasible for individuals with autism
aged upwards of 11 or 12 years (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985: 40).
This discrepancy in ‘chronological’ and ‘mental’ ages was neces-
sary for experimentation because high functioning individuals
with autism and Intelligence Quotient (IQ) scores of around 100
were still largely unheard of in the 1980s (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2005: 628). Why there has been an increase in the mean IQ of
the population of individuals diagnosed with autism remains a
hotly debated topic (see; Hoekstra et al., 2009: 534; Skuse, 2007:
534. From a social science perspective see Hollin (2013:
153e160)). Despite already being understood as a neuro-
developmental disorder (e.g.; Baron-Cohen, 1989: 113), therefore,
the study of infant development has historically been missing
from experimental psychological research into autism.
It is noticeable that this dearth of experimental research into the
infant has begun to be addressed within the early twenty-ﬁrst
century, and with reportedly signiﬁcant consequences. Within
interview, for example, one Professor mused uponwhat they saw as
the ﬁeld's misplaced emphasis upon cognitive capacities, broadly
believed to be innate, during the 1980s and early 1990s. This
emphasis upon innate ability manifested itself in the assertion that
the capacity to pass tests such as the SAT depended upon innate
cognitive modules (a theory of mind module, in the current
instance), which simply came ‘online’ at a particular point in child
development (Leslie, 1987). Considering the importance of those
errors within the ﬁeld, the Professor concludes that:
In fact, what's happened, as far as I can see, (.) is that, er::,
empirical changes have somewhat ((coughs)) modiﬁed thewhole ﬁeld anyway so it hasn't been a great disadvantage, er,
and in particular as people have looked at, er, studies of younger
and younger and their siblings really you get into a realmwhere
it's clearly an issue of non-verbal communication that's, that's,
er, at stake, and so things like joint-attention, which was kind of
assimilated to a theory of mind picture, actually itself needs to
be understood, erm, not in terms of what follows from it but in
terms of its, what, its own standing, its own importance, and
indeed what it derives from. (Professor, interview 10)
According to the Professor, ‘empirical changes’ have ‘modiﬁed the
whole ﬁeld’ of autism research since the 1980s. The most signiﬁ-
cant of these empirical changes has been the tendency for research
to focus upon participants who are ‘younger and younger’, a change
which has shifted attention towards ‘non-verbal communication’.
Such a shift towards the non-verbal is apparent evenwith ‘a theory
of mind picture’ (outlined above in the work of Baron-Cohen et al.)
which has now ‘assimilated’ ‘joint-attention’; the ability of two
individuals to share an interest in a particular referent (for example,
a child may point at a passing car in order to draw the attention of a
parent to it).
This focus upon non-verbal behaviours is again apparent in the
following interview extract where a Postdoctoral Researcher muses
upon the problems of conceptualising, and then experimenting
upon, the ‘social brain’. In this extract, the Postdoctoral Researcher
is concerned with ﬁnding a suitable non-social control stimulus
(examples offered are a ‘house’, a ‘toy’, and an ‘object’) with which
to contrast a social stimulus, a ‘face’, in experimental work:
I mean do you control a face to a house or a face to an object or a
face to a toy and all of those decisions impact how specialised
the social brain looks to, whatever age you’re looking at. But
there are certainly regions that, you know, process biological
motion versus non-biological motion as far as we can tell that
kind of thing. (Postdoctoral Researcher, interview 14)
Just as Baron-Cohenwas, this researcher is interested in teasing out
speciﬁc social impairments; they are interested in knowing how
the responses, which may be eye movements or the activation of
particular brain regions, of individuals of ‘whatever age’ with
autism differ when they observe a face (social stimulus) compared
to when they observe, say, a house (non-social stimulus).
Despite this shared search for social impairment, however, there
are signiﬁcant differences between the accounts of the Postdoctoral
Researcher and Baron-Cohen. Whereas Baron-Cohen was con-
cerned with belief, for the Postdoctoral Researcher, the archetypal
social stimulus of concern to the ‘social brain’ is the ‘face’ or,
perhaps, ‘biological motion’. In focussing upon these phenomena e
comprehension of the body and its movement e the interviewee is
absolutely typical of the ﬁeld as it presently stands (e.g. Klin et al.,
2009). As will be discussed in greater detail below, when contem-
porary autism research with infants seeks to present social stimuli,
those stimuli are invariably based upon eyes, faces, or whole bodies
presented in the absence of speech, for it is these bodily responses
that can be measured in infants and turned into data within the
bounds of the research practices deemed suitable for this popula-
tion. Similarly, when one wishes to examine a social response what
is examined is one's bodily responses, either external movements
(e.g. eye movement), or internal changes (e.g. particular activations
of the social brain network measured through various neuro-
imaging techniques). What the juxtaposition of these two research
strands seeks to demonstrate is that, within contemporary autism
research, there has been a turn away from intentionality, belief,
language, meaning, and the abstract symbolic world and towards
automatic and unconscious bodily states. There has been, in short, a
somaticisation of autism.
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methodological or theoretical primacy. It is not being argued that
theory precedes method, that the use of the SAT in the 1980s is a
mere symptom of a particular underlying theoretical framework.
Nor is it being argued that method determines theory, that the
‘social brain’ discussed in interview, above, is formed entirely in the
image of the neuroscientiﬁc methodologies taken to it. Instead, and
as has been argued both generally (Hacking, 1988: 507) and, as
discussed in the introduction, in relation to autism speciﬁcally
(Evans, 2013; Hollin, 2014) it is argued that method and theory are
in a sense mutually constitutive, forming a theoretico-
methodological regime which shapes the object under consider-
ation. The remainder of this article will consider the autism which
emerges from a theoretico-methodological regime in which
research into infancy is given increased importance.2.3.2. Infant sibling research
Autism is rarely diagnosed before the age of two (Elsabbagh
et al., 2012: 338) meaning that, unless retrospective methods
such as video analyses or questionnaires are deployed, all research
into autism conducted with infants younger than that age is
invariably performed with those deemed to be somehow ‘at risk’ of
the condition. As stated by one of the interviewees for this project,
two groups of infants are identiﬁed as being at particular risk of
developing autism “… [the] at risk sibling or … kids born prema-
turely, erm, because they've compromised development not just for
autism but for a whole bunch of other neurodevelopmental out-
comes” (Professor, interview 17).
The study of those born pre- or im-maturely has a long,
nuanced, and variable history within medicine (Armstrong, 1986:
223e226) and consideration of this group has only increased in
recent years. However, this group did not feature signiﬁcantly in
the interviews conducted here. Instead it was the younger siblings
of children already diagnosed with autism, or so called ‘infant sibs’,
who came under discussion most frequently within in interview.
The following extract captures the essence of this infant sibling
research:
PD: So we'll be recruiting infant siblings when they're four to six
months, siblings who have older siblings with autism, erm, and
then testing them at ten months, fourteen months, twenty four
months and thirty six months. Er:: (.) and at thirty six months
they'll have this full diagnostic battery so I'll be able to tell which
infants meet criteria for a diagnosis of autism and which infants
don't.
I: Mm hm.
PD: Erm, and so then we’ll look back at data from those early
time points, er, to try and ﬁgure out if there's anything that
predicts which infant's going to go on to develop au’ autism or
not, erm, and if there's anything that predicts kind of g::, gra-
dations of severity or language levels or some more continuous
prediction. (Postdoctoral Researcher, interview 14)
Within this research programme, families with an elder child who
has already been diagnosed with autism are recruited by re-
searchers seeking to identify individuals who are perceived to be at
particularly high risk of developing the condition. If a subset of
these children are later diagnosed as having autism, researchers
will be able to retrospectively investigate those children's behav-
iours during infancy in an attempt to discover unrecognised early
differences. Such studies are becoming increasingly prevalent;
within the United Kingdom, for example, The British Autism Study
of Infant Siblings (BASIS) network is a multi-million pound
collaboration between twelve universities with afﬁliations tohundreds of scientists all over the world. Similar networks exist in
the United States (e.g. Baby Siblings Research Consortium) and a
European wide group (Enhancing the Scientiﬁc Study of Early
Autism) has recently been established (see B€olte et al. (2013) for
details).
By recruiting infant siblings, researchers are able to conduct
experiments longitudinally (from four to 36 months in the above
researcher's study) with children prior to the apparent emergence
of behavioural symptoms. In fact, it is important to remember that
the majority of these children will not go on to develop autism. A
sufﬁcient number of infants will procure a subsequent diagnosis,
however, to make studies of this sort feasible. As a Postdoctoral
Researcher states:
Well so our sample are at high risk for autism which means
they have an older sibling with autism and which means about
thirty percent of them will also develop autism. But the only
reason we choose this sample is because we want to have more
children with autism at the end because otherwise (.) we'd
have to test hundreds ((laughs)). (Postdoctoral Researcher,
interview 8)
The possibility that ‘about thirty percent’ of those infants tested
will go on to develop autism means that, even considering the
signiﬁcant attrition rates, prospective studies become possible.
Despite requiring a signiﬁcant amount of both ﬁnance and
patience, infant sibs studies were frequently described by autism
researchers as being amongst the most important in the ﬁeld
because they have the capacity to “tell us something about, erm, the
development of autism” (Reader, interview 3), a loci of attention
which, as described in the previous section, has been broadly ab-
sent from research in previous decades.2.3.3. Facilitating infant sibling research
It has been widely claimed that the emergence of populations
claimed to be ‘at risk’ of various medical conditions is closely
linked to forms of biotechnological enterprise, most notably
molecular genetics (Rose, 2010; Shostak, 2010), which play an
important role in contemporary autism studies. However there
are at least two further reasons, particular to autism, why infant
sibling research is far more feasible at this particular historical
juncture. Firstly, research of this type is made signiﬁcantly easier
by ‘autism epidemic’ of the 1990s, which saw prevalence rates
increase from around 4:10,000 to 1:100 (Wing and Potter, 2002:
151). This increased prevalence potentially makes any kind of
research into autism easier to conduct, but a longitudinal
research programme where a signiﬁcant majority of participants
will never even receive a diagnosis of autism requires a far
greater number of willing participants than does an experiment
of the type conducted by Baron-Cohen et al. in the 1980s.
Research into those at risk of autism has, then, particularly
beneﬁted from the twenty ﬁve-fold increase in diagnosis over the
past thirty years.
Secondly, infant sibling research has been facilitated by the
emergence of a variety of methodological techniques which require
minimal engagement from the participant. This link between
method and subject is expanded upon by another Professor who
participated in this study, detailing belowwhat they see as some of
the most important research in the ﬁeld:
“One [important strand of research] is groups who:: are running
these at risk sibling [studies]… Erm, you, and, erm, (.) and, and,
and then that overlaps with the group of people who use new
technologies. So they use, you know, erm, eye-tracking and::,
you know, erm, EEG and n’, n’, nears, n’, n’, near infrared spec-
troscopy and other, other sorts of, you know, w’, w’, well now
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four month olds.” (Professor, interview 17)
Within this extract there is the explicit linking of research into
infants at risk of autism and ‘the group of people who use new
technologies’; speciﬁc technologies mentioned include ‘EEG’, ‘near
infrared spectroscopy’ (NIRS), ‘fMRI’, and ‘eye-tracking’.
The methodologies mentioned here are very different to one
another. Some, such as functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI) and Electroencephalography (EEG) examine brain func-
tion while others, such as structural Magnetic Resonance Im-
aging (sMRI), examine brain structure. Others methods such as
eye-tracking experiments, which monitor eye ﬁxation and eye
movement with the use of a camera mounted on glasses or a
helmet, allow an analysis of behavioural responses only possible
with the aid of technology. Further, experiments utilising resting
state neuroimaging techniques aim to examine participants'
brain activity as they lie still, in the absence of both stimulus and
response, and are directed entirely inwards. Attention based
paradigms, meanwhile, still rely upon the presentation of an
external, explicit stimulus, albeit a stimulus that the participant
need not consciously respond to. What these methods do have
in common is that there is no comprehension necessarily
required on behalf of the participant; it is perfectly feasible for
stimuli (say, ‘auditory stimulation’) to be presented and neural
response measured without any particular engagement or un-
derstanding. Thus, research becomes possible in new pop-
ulations such as those with low functioning autism (Hollin,
2013: 172e175) and, the chief concern of both interviewees
and this paper, infants. These are experiments done on infants,
rather than with infants. As the same Professor quoted directly
above notes:
I think that's sort of quite an interesting sort of methodology
because it suddenly doesn't rely on you, erm, (.) asking
someone a question, you know, erm, and of course a', you
know, there's a long history it's also true in infant, you know,
experimentation where you do things like habituation tasks
that, or looking time tasks, or whatever it is. But this is a sort
of, you know, different sort of methodology. (Professor, inter-
view 17)
The professor here focuses upon new types of methodology, those
mentioned above, which ‘suddenly’ don't require the experimenter
to ask ‘someone a question’, thus reducing task demands.
Callard andMargulies (2011) have already called attention to the
potentially important ontological work based around these
methods which require little in the way of active participation on
behalf of the participant. Callard and Marguiles claim of resting
state functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging that:
“… there appear already to be indications that the resting state
and the DMN [Default Mode Network] might be installed as a
new foundation of the self… it is the subject ‘at rest’ that e by
dint of her default mode brain activity e potentially holds the
key to subjectivity tout court.”
(Callard and Margulies, 2011: 244, italics in original)
Such ontological claims are clearly crucial for understanding
emerging technologies which examine the subject at rest. However
these methods also have signiﬁcant epistemic possibilities and are
described by researchers as being crucial for infant research:
I: And it perhaps goes hand in hand with the, erm, (.) recruiting
younger and younger infants because there are methodologies
which allow you, er, to test hypotheses in different age groups
than behavioural tests?PD: Yeah, exactly so we test four month olds and, you know,
there's so little you can do with a four month old, you can
basically look at what they look at and you can look at what their
brain does. (Postdoctoral Researcher, interview 14)
Like never before, then, these methodologies permit the possibility
to explore what an infant ‘looks at’ and ‘what their brain does’. The
availability of these methodologies, alongside the autism epidemic,
have therefore facilitated the turn to infancy in autism research.2.4. Neuroscience and seeing the real autism
Despite emerging, necessarily, at a particular historical moment
and resting upon particular understandings of autism, signiﬁcant
claims were made by interviewees of these new technologies and
their capacity to revolutionise knowledge concerning autism. An
Associate Professor, for example, described ‘brain scanning’ as
‘leading to a lot of new insights’ since being introduced to the ﬁeld:
I mean brain scanning M, MRI scanning and the analytic tech-
niques and er:: themicro arrays of various k, types have possibly
been the biggest, er, new, er:: I mean h’, have, have led to quite,
quite a lot of new insights in the last couple, couple of decades.
(Associate Professor, interview 6)
The following quote, from a Postdoctoral Fellow, is illustrative
when considering the purported nature of these novel insights:
I:… So how, how do you think all the, or how do you think that
(.) imaging and the neurosciences are (.) contributing to (.) is-
sues around autism?
PD: Erm:: (.) I think they're contributing a lot. I think, erm, so my
personal view is that (.) one, one of the best bits of research
that's come out at the moment is looking at increased noise in
the neural networks in, erm, in people with autism. And I think
that ﬁnding a neural marker is so important because it means
that it can be seen irrespective of tasks so, and also in whatever
age and whatever level of functioning. So I think a lot of the
problem with behaviour is, erm, you just don't know what's
behind it and you also, you don't know whether task demands
are stopping you see the real, the true abilities of people.
Whereas if you put them in the scanner then, and especially if
you can put them in the scanner at rest or asleep and be able to
see a difference between autism and typical populations then
you have an amazing ability to diagnose. (Postdoctoral Fellow,
interview 12)
While there is a good deal of hype surrounding neuroscience in
general and fMRI in particular (Choudhury et al., 2009), and while
the majority of fMRI studies do indeed require the explicit, recog-
nised engagement of participants, the above quotation captures so
much of the speciﬁc hype and the hope surrounding the resting
state technologies which are crucial for research with infants.
Autism research is constructed here as being fundamentally
hampered by reliance upon behavioural measures, the results of
which may not reﬂect ability as much as they reﬂect ‘task de-
mands’. It has already been discussed, above, how the traditional
experimental paradigms of cognitive psychology, such as the SAT,
require participants to be able to accurately to report their beliefs
verbally. Neuroscientiﬁc technologies, especially those that can be
used while the participant is ‘at rest or asleep’ provide the oppor-
tunity to ‘know what's behind’ verbal behaviour and ‘see the real,
the true abilities of autism’ in a way that is not dependent upon
such abilities to perform. It is also noticeable within the present
extract that the Research Fellow shifts attention towards a
consideration of infants, recognising that the capacity to see ‘the
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offering an ‘amazing ability to diagnose’.
It has been argued that when new technologies are taken to the
body, the body is not left unaltered. Numerous technologies from
the panopticon (Armstrong, 1985; Foucault, 1991: 200) to the
census (Hacking,1983: 280e281) have attempted tomake the body
cohere to the demands of particular regimes, leaving a body “totally
imprinted by history” (Foucault, 1977: 148). The biosciences
generally (Rose, 2007) and the neurosciences in particular (Prasad,
2005) are no different in this regard, being not biologically reduc-
tive but productive, encouraging new ways of seeing and being
(Buchbinder, 2014). If, as Armstrong has claimed, we should be
encouraged not to see “the atlas as a representation of the body but
the body as a representation of the atlas” (Armstrong, 1983: 2) then
it seems reasonable to conclude that neuroanatomic atlases that
have been constructed in the twenty-ﬁrst century should be seen as
possessing the potential to be similarly productive (Beaulieu, 2001,
2003; Prasad, 2005). Instead of, or as well as, going beyond or
behind method, as is suggested by the interviewee above, the focus
upon passivity and infancy encourages the construction of a new
autism with novel characteristics. These characteristics become
apparent when considering the questions that autism researchers
raise within infant sibling research.
2.4.1. An othering
What was apparent within the qualitative interviews conducted
for this project was a certain tension over the nature of the
knowledge obtained via methodologies suitable for research with
infant populations. Firstly, and as described above, these technol-
ogies are believed to remove or reduce task demands, to get
‘behind’ behaviour, and see ‘the real’ or ‘the true’ autism, thus of-
fering an ‘amazing ability to diagnose’ and examine autism in all its
forms, in new populations, and in new ways. Simultaneously,
however, it is apparent that these methodological innovations
radically constrict the type of questions that can be asked.
It is clear from the scientists' descriptions of their research that
the perceived abilities of the infants under their study constrain the
type of research questions which they are able to ask. As quoted
above, one researcher remarked that “there's so little you can do
with a four month old, you can basically look at what they look at
and you can look at what their brain does”. Given these restrictions,
it is perhaps unsurprising that particular topics, such as attention,
which are amenable to study in infants through available tech-
nologies, are given signiﬁcant weighting by researchers in the ﬁeld:
We could be looking at attention, for example, how are, whether
they are shifting attention from one object to another. Again you
can do this with the young, very young infants just showing
something on a computer screen, making them look at this
object and then there's something else appearing, how fast are
they to orient. (Postdoctoral Researcher, interview 8)
What becomes apparent is that it is the limitations of infants, as
much as their autism-relevant abilities, which drive the questions,
such as ‘ability to shift attention from one object to another’, asked
within infancy research:
I: And does a lot of this [research] focus around the area of
attention? Is that a kind of
PD: Yeah, it's one of the key areas. Because, because the things
that ((laughs)), infants can't, I mean they can do a bit, but there's,
there's, there's not a lot they can do, erm, but I think focusing on
the more, sort of, domain general mechanisms like paying
attention to things, which they can do, they can learn, erm, to
habituation (.), erm, they can show preference to a social stimuli,which is important in terms of them getting enough social input,
they can, you know, basic vocalisation which is important in
terms of getting, so those sort of basic learning processes that,
that all infants have to an extent, but to a varying extent.
(Postdoctoral Researcher, interview 14)
In this extract it is noticeable that, after being asked whether
attention is a key topic of investigation, the Postdoctoral Researcher
focuses uponwhat the infant can't do; ‘they can do a bit, but there's
not a lot they can do’. The topic of ‘attention’, it appears, is not so
much of interest a priori but is, rather, an area of investigation
which is amenable to both the ability levels of infants and the re-
quirements of the technology. Suggesting that infants give their
opinions, ruminate, or make active decisions e all staples of the
cognitive psychology literature on autism e is clearly not a
worthwhile endeavour. Infants can ‘learn’, ‘habituate’, and ‘show
preference’ but, as this interviewee noted elsewhere, “they’re not
going to point at something” (Postdoctoral Researcher, interview
14).
That the capacities of infants are perceived to be limited does
not, however, mean that infants do not need to comply with the
demands of the experiment. As one Reader succinctly put it, “brain
imaging isn't terribly pleasant, you know (laughs)” (Reader, inter-
view 1) and infants, of course, are demanding participants who
“don't like lying down in the scanner and it's dark and noisy”
(Postdoctoral Researcher, interview 14). Research can only progress
“if you can keep them still, which is a challenge, erm, an::d erm get
them to look at a monitor and be interested in the thing that's in
front of them” (Professor, interview 17). These methodologies
which do not require comprehension on the part of the participant,
therefore, are still practically problematic. Eye-tracking, for
example, is not:
without its difﬁculties ((laughs)) like anything else, you know,
there's (.) there's certain, it's reduced task demands in some
ways but you know they do have to sit still, they do have to pay
attention, they do have to look at the scre::en, so you know you
have task demands there. (Reader, interview 1)
The belief, therefore, that a lack of comprehension in participants
investigated with these emerging technologies means that they are
‘beyondmethods’, or demonstrates that participants do not need to
actively co-operate seems misplaced. On the contrary, a lack of
comprehension should not be equatedwith lack of compliance, and
a great deal of compliance, in a broad sense, is required on behalf of
the participant. If the experimenter is unable to make the partici-
pant cohere to the methodological demands required of them, then
the experiment cannot progress.
What these technologies reveal is a partial picture. However,
this particular representation of autism is nonetheless presented as
being ‘behind’ methodology, whole, as ‘the truth’, as ‘the real
autism’. This leads to a conceptualisation of autism made in the
image of infant, where a signiﬁcant number of behaviours which do
not conform to the requirements of these methods or these par-
ticipants e those which rely upon meaning, understanding, and
language, for example e are othered, while those behaviours
amendable to this theoretico-methodological regime (chieﬂy,
bodily states) hold centre stage. It is in this sense that these tech-
nologies can be described as productive, forming new visions of
autism and social abnormality. Broadly, this performance of autism
is related to a somatisation of the disorder.3. Conclusion: autism is the image of the infant
This paper has argued that, since the turn of the 21st century,
there has been a reorientation in autism research, with particular
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been argued that these infants have become available for study
through both the autism epidemic of the 1990s and the emergence
of various technologies which permit the use of participants who
are not meaningfully engaged in the experimental activity. While
researchers claim that such technologies allow the examination of
the ‘real’ autism, it has been argued here that such technologies are
in fact productive, and have led to new forms of social disorder in
autism. In particular, it has been claimed here that these technol-
ogies shift attention away from symbolic, meaningful, interper-
sonal interaction and instead focus upon a newly formed, socially
disordered body.
It is important to note that the presence of such striking dis-
continuities does not preclude the presence of important conti-
nuities. As has been widely discussed within the literature, the
psychological sciences have, over the past ﬁfty years, had a very
particular view of what it means to be social, constructing a “social
in the shape of a crowd” (Danziger, 1992: 313) where ‘social stimuli’
are reduced to other agents in the immediate vicinity of the indi-
vidual (Danziger, 1992; Graumann, 1986; Greenwood, 2004). It has
been shown that the cognitive sciences of autism rely upon this
model (Hollin, 2014) and the conceptualisations of development,
infancy, and the social put forward within this framework differ
markedly from, for example, psychoanalytic alternatives (e.g.
Hobson, 1993).
Nonetheless, even within this broader framework, there has
been a signiﬁcant re-articulation of what it means to have autism
and to be ‘social’. Within the current regime, social acts are taken to
be both extra- and pre-discursive in nature. The social is pre-
discursive in the sense that social (in)ability can be measured in
those, like infants, without language abilities. The social is extra-
discursive because social (in)ability can be measured without
recourse to meaning and language, thus ensuring that individuals
with competent language use can still be classiﬁed as socially
abnormal. Indeed, even the notion of (false) belief, so central to
debates within the 1980s and seemingly tied to explicit under-
standing of other agents and their intentions, has been reimagined
within recent years to allow for the possibility of ‘implicit false
belief’, a form of belief taken to be animalistic, automatic and un-
conscious, measured through tasks like those outlined above and
without the necessary understanding of participants (Frith and
Frith, 2012: 306).
Such a conclusion would be worthy of consideration if the
consequences concerned only those infants ‘at risk’ of autism. This,
however, is not the case for two quite different reasons. Firstly,
interest in, for example, implicit mimicry and imitation is becoming
increasingly central to broader narratives of autism. In studies
which examine implicit mimicry in autism (e.g. Marsh et al., 2013),
‘social behaviour’ is reduced to phenomena such as contagious
yawning e the unconscious, bodily imitation of those in our im-
mediate vicinity. The capacity to extend research ﬁndings with
infants to the rest of the population with autism is something that
was remarked upon within interview. For example, and while
expressing some doubts about comparisons between infants and
adults, one Professor speculated that:
You can actually get ex’, the same experiment which would rely
on new technologies like, erm, (.) eye-tracking or:: EEG or ERP
that you can use with infants and adults and y:: so, you know,
you can't do that with behavioural experiments, you have to
have different experiments y’, erm, erm, there's an even issue,
even an issue of whether you can really sort of do it with in-
fants and sort of adults. But, but you can get parallel versions at
the very least and possibly even completely identical sort of
versions. Which I think opens up all sorts of possibilities interms of, you know, erm, investigating things across a wide sort
of span of development which I think is, erm, good. (Professor,
interview 17)
‘New technologies’ may allow for ‘the same experiment’ to be
deployed with adults and infants, thereby facilitating comparisons
between those populations. It seems certain that as studies such as
those described by this Professor seek to make comparisons be-
tween adults and infants believed to be at risk of autism, the
inability to make the intentionality, meaning, and language of the
normal non-infant population intelligible within the context of pre-
verbal infants ensures that focus upon the body, and the social
disorder inherent within it, will be extended to the rest of the
population with autism.
A second consequence of the reconstruction of autism as a social
disorder of the body is of relevance for subjects at quite some
distance from the condition itself. The biosciences generally
(Meloni, 2014) and the neurosciences in particular (Young, 2012)
have increasingly come to place sociality at the very centre of what
it means to be human. Within this framework autism, understood
as social disorder, is increasingly understood to offer fundamental
insights into what it means to be human. Thus, the emergence of a
pathological, social body in autism proffers new possibilities con-
cerning what it means for humans to be socially normal
(Canguilhem, 1991: 100).
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